

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

AC/RC INTEGRATION PROGRAMS: KEEPING THEM RELEVANT

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 03 MAY 2004		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE AC/RC Integration Programs: Keeping Them Relevant				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Michael Donovan				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached file.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 32	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

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TITLE: AC/RC INTEGRATION PROGRAMS: KEEPING THEM RELEVANT

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 19 March 2004 PAGES: 32 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the current Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) integration programs and propose further options for AC/RC programs as the Army Transforms. As background, it reviews some history and policy regarding AC/RC integration. It then assesses the effectiveness of some current integration programs. Finally, it proposes some program options and modifications that will successfully posture the Army as a "Total Force" in the future.

Since the inception of the Total Force Policy in 1973, many programs and actions have helped to integrate the AC and RC to implement the Total Force Concept. Despite these initiatives, we have not yet found the best ways to integrate the Active and Reserve components. So on-going projects are designed to achieve a total integration of the forces. Some have worked well; some seem little more than token efforts undertaken more for political reasons than to bolster the Army. With the advent of the Global War on Terrorism and the lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, we must anticipate significant changes in the structuring of both the Active and Reserve components. We now have the opportunity to build further upon what we have learned over the past 30 years and take the next step in AC/RC integration. The Army needs to design and adopt programs that effectively reduce historical antagonisms between the components. Specifically, the Army should consider the Full Time Manning Program within the Reserve Forces as a model for integrating the components while increasing the readiness of the Reserve Forces.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	III
AC/RC INTEGRATION PROGRAMS - WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE TO KEEP THEM RELEVANT	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.....	2
CURRENT AC/RC PROGRAMS.....	3
AC/RC BATTALION COMMAND EXCHANGE PROGRAM	4
TRAINING SUPPORT XXI	5
MULTI-COMPONENT UNITS.....	6
RESERVE FULL TIME MANNING.....	6
ARMY TEAMING PROGRAM.....	8
WHAT EFFECT WILL TRANSFORMATION HAVE ON AC/RC INTEGRATION?	9
SO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? POSSIBLE CHANGES	10
UPDATE THE FULL TIME SUPPORT (FTS) MANNING PROGRAM	12
INTEGRATION OF AC AND AGR TOURS OF DUTY.....	12
CONSOLIDATION OF AC AND AGR PERSONNEL SYSTEMS	13
TRAINING SUPPORT BATTALIONS.....	14
AC/RC BATTALION COMMANDER EXCHANGE PROGRAM.....	14
MULTI-COMPONENT UNITS.....	15
BARRIERS TO CHANGE.....	15
CONCLUSION	16
ENDNOTES	19
BIBLIOGRAPHY	23

AC/RC INTEGRATION PROGRAMS - WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE TO KEEP THEM RELEVANT

Total Force is no longer a 'concept'; it is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Reserve and Guard forces into a homogeneous whole.¹

— James R. Schlesinger
Secretary of Defense 1973

INTRODUCTION

The following pages include background discussion pertinent to understanding the history of the Army's Active and Reserve Component integration. It then assesses the effectiveness of some of the current programs. It concludes with suggestions for possible changes and additions to the programs as the Army continues to transform while fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Since Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger introduced the Total Force concept in 1973, the Army has developed and implemented a number of policies and programs to bring the Reserve and Active Components closer so they can function as a fully integrated team. These programs have indeed helped to better integrate the Active and Reserve Components; they have had an overall positive effect on Reserve readiness. Even so, the greatest hindrances to integration are cultural biases and stereotypes that have existed between the Active and Reserve Component (AC/RC) forces for years. AC members tend to stereotype Reserves as untrained, unprofessional, "weekend warriors" who are ill equipped for real military operations. On the other hand RC personnel often stereotype AC forces as arrogant and bloodthirsty who don't have a firm understanding of the "real world". These biases and stereotypes totally misrepresents RC and AC capabilities, but have proven to be barriers to effective component integration. These biases have lessened, but have not been eliminated since the inception of the Total Force Policy.

This is a critical time for change in the Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) integration programs. Because the Army is transforming, future AC/RC integration programs need to focus on supporting the future force. If the current programs are not updated and re-designed to serve the Army's transformational efforts, then they will become irrelevant. The timing is right for the development and implementation of far-reaching transformational programs that significantly increase the effectiveness of AC/RC integration. With our current

wartime focus and transformational efforts, we have a great opportunity for significant positive changes in our integration programs.

However, these changes will require significant attitudinal changes from both components to be effective. They must also contribute significantly to transformation. We must be prepared to support any force structure that may be developed as we transform our Army, regardless of cultural biases. Both components must be prepared to support whatever actions are necessary in order to be able to defend against the asymmetrical enemy that we face today.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Reserve forces are our strongest link to the American people.²

—GEN Dennis Reimer

Integration of the Reserve and Active Components into a Total Force in the defense of the United States has been a stated objective of the U.S. Army since the implementation of the Total Force Policy of 1973. The Total Force Concept was a truly masterful policy decision that has paid great dividends to the nation over the past 30 years. It has been the catalyst for transforming the Army Guard and Reserve into a viable and critical part of our National Defense.

The Total Force Policy originated with the findings of the Gates Commission in 1969. This Commission was created by President Nixon to examine the viability of moving to an all-volunteer force; it also addressed issues associated with Reserve Component organization.³ Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird coined the phrase “Total Force” in an August 1970 memorandum sent to President Nixon in conjunction with the findings of the Gates Commission.⁴ Later, in March of 1971, Laird solidified the Total Force concept as he cited it to describe the Nixon administration’s defense strategy to the Senate Armed Services Committee.⁵ Finally in August 1973 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger codified the Total Force concept into a policy.⁶ From this point on, all facets of military AC/RC force management and defense budgeting has been impacted by the policy.

In 1999, AC/RC integration gained another significant boost when Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki declared that completing the full integration of the AC/RC was one of his six main objectives.⁷ It was under General Shinseki’s direction that many of the present AC/RC integration programs were developed and implemented.

Because of the changes resulting from implementation of the Total Force Policy, Reserve Component soldiers are involved in almost every ongoing contingency operation; currently more than 130,000 Reservists are deployed worldwide. Extended mobilizations, some in excess of one year, have become the norm for many Reserve Component Soldiers. This unprecedented reserve mobilization in support of the GWOT only heightens the need for a trained, ready and relevant Reserve Force that is totally integrated into the Army's force structure.

Today the Department of Defense (DoD) is considering how to better integrate the Reserves into the Active Force and expand the RC's contingency and homeland defense missions. Some of the alternatives are outlined in the DoD's Reserve Component Employment Study 2005.⁸ With the number of missions increasing for our Total Force, some analysts recommend an increase of the Active Force to fulfill our current myriad of missions. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, however, does not propose an increase to active end strength because of a reluctance to increase the personnel budget.⁹ With no increase in AC strength on the horizon, with mobilizations of Reserves increasing and the GWOT expanding, the readiness and responsiveness of our Reserve Forces have become more critical.

All of our integration programs must focus on support to the future force. We must review our current programs, retain and modify those that remain relevant to the future force, discard those programs that transformation will make irrelevant, and implement new programs that will help our Army transform to the Total Force.

CURRENT AC/RC PROGRAMS

In July 2000 the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed four of the Army's integration programs: Integrated Divisions, Force XXI Heavy Division redesign, Teaming, and the Integrated Task Force in Bosnia.¹⁰ The report listed a number of other programs, but did not comment on their effectiveness. These programs included: Multi-Component units, Integrated Light Infantry Battalions, Training Support XXI, AC Associate Unit Mentor Relationships, and the AC/RC Battalion Command Exchange Program. An important AC/RC integration program, Reserve Full Time Manning, arguably the most significant integration effort, was not considered in this report. This full time manning program, however, has been the subject of a number of previous GAO reports, but it has not been designated as an integration program.¹¹

This SRP reviews five Army programs that focus on AC/RC integration. These programs may prove to be the most viable of the current programs as the Army transforms. All have been successful to varying degrees, but some may require significant changes to contribute to future

Army structure. These programs include the AC/RC Battalion Commander's Exchange Program, Training Support Battalions, Multi-Component units, Full Time Manning in Reserve Units, and the Army Teaming Project.

AC/RC BATTALION COMMAND EXCHANGE PROGRAM

The AC/RC Battalion Commander Exchange program facilitates the exchange of battalion commanders among the Active Component, Reserve and National Guard. It places active duty, Centrally Selected List officers into RC Battalion Commands; likewise, Troop Program Unit (TPU) Reserve and Guard officers are brought onto active duty for a two-year period to command AC battalions.

The United States Army Reserve (USAR) Battalion Commander Exchange Program was launched in 1999 when two Active and two Reserve Component lieutenant colonels participated in the program. The program started a few years earlier with the National Guard. Currently over 20 Active, Guard and Reserve Lieutenant Colonels participate in the program.

This very specific program focuses on battalion command. It does not address further AC/RC integration efforts. The program was recently increased to include selected staff positions in addition to battalion commands, but it remains small in scope. A positive effect of this program is its success in reducing cultural bias between the components. Unfortunately, because of its limited scope, the program is available to only a small number of Active and Reserve Component personnel each year.

Currently both the National Guard and Army Reserves are having trouble supporting the program. During FY-03 the National Guard did not submit any names for the exchange program. Also, the Army Reserves are utilizing Active Guard Reserve (AGR) officers to fulfill the requirements of the program because they do not have qualified TPU volunteers.¹² Currently it seems the RC cannot effectively support this program, which may put the program in jeopardy. Unfortunately, this inability to support the program with qualified officers on the part of the RC may tend to contribute to the AC bias of the RC as not a truly professional organization.

Overall the AC/RC Commander exchange program effectively targets one of the major barriers with total integration, the issue of cultural biases. It is a low cost program that is flexible enough to remain relevant regardless of force structure changes within the components. Unfortunately, it does not greatly affect either of the components due to its limited scope.

TRAINING SUPPORT XXI

The Training Support XXI concept was conceived in March 1997 and implemented in October 1999 as a result of the FY-93 National Defense Authorization Act.¹³ Training Support XXI focuses totally on RC training and training support.

The Training Support XXI structure includes five Reserve Training Support Divisions (TSDs) that fall under the operational control of both the USAR Command and one of the Continental United States Armies (1st or 5th US Army). Like most RC units, the TSDs are comprised of TPU Reserve Commanders, staff, and Soldiers. However, these five TSDs include over 4,100 AC positions, so they are significantly AC/RC integrated.

The TSDs each have four Training Support Brigades (TSBs) that assist RC units in both developing and conducting training. The TSBs are designed to be flexible and responsive, which enables them to integrate into all levels of their supported RC units. They organize into small teams to provide habitual training support to RC platoons, companies, as well as battalions. These TSBs provide simulation as well as mobile training teams and Combat Training Center style lanes training support to units throughout their area of responsibility. The training teams maintain a habitual relationship with their RC units. So AC soldiers of the TSBs serve with RC soldiers in supported units. The traditional Reserve TSB soldiers augment the training during lanes training and annual training events, thereby taking advantage of their integrated force structure.

All of the 4,100 AC soldiers who are assigned to the TSDs are competent experienced officers and senior NCOs; they bring up-to-date doctrine and training Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) to RC units. This relationship helps to keep the RC units current on Army requirements and helps focus the critical training resources available to the RC. Just as importantly, many of these AC support personnel will be transferred back into AC units upon completion of their TSD tours. In their new duty assignments they will be able to inform their AC comrades on the issues and challenges associated with RC manning and training.

The “cross pollination” acquired during these AC/RC tours has helped to significantly reduce some of the negative AC biases regarding their RC counterparts. Training Support XXI has significantly assisted AC/RC integration, with far-reaching effects. This program will be affected by future force structure changes. To remain relevant, it must be restructured along with all of the RC units to remain postured to assist them both during and after final restructuring.

MULTI-COMPONENT UNITS

The Army's Multi-Component unit program was established by Headquarters, Department of the Army in June 1998. Initially, eleven test units were organized to start the program. Since then, numerous units have been added, ranging from integrated divisions to companies and detachments.¹⁴ Plans call for an end state of approximately 100 Multi-Component units by FY-07.

A multi-component unit is commonly defined as an organization under a single Modified Table of Organization that contains subordinate organizations or personnel from more than one component [(AC, USAR, and Army National Guard (ARNG)]. With the exceptions of the integrated division, these units are designed to go to war as a totally integrated team. Indeed many multi-component units successfully deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Given the increase in participating units from the initial eleven, the Multi-Component Unit Program is starting to have a significant positive influence on both the AC and RC. This day to day teaming is helping to erode the powerful stereotypes that exist between the components. The negative bias of the RC, once prolific in the AC, has significantly diminished as a result of the Multi-Component Unit Program.

The Multi-Component Unit Program has achieved its major objectives by enhancing integration of the Army, improving the readiness posture of its units, optimizing the unique capabilities of each component, as well as tearing down the historic stereotypes that have existed within the components. The program should remain important and relevant far into the future.

RESERVE FULL TIME MANNING

Although not reviewed as a current AC/RC integration program by the GAO in their July 2000 report to Congress, Reserve Unit Full Time Manning is a significant and important program. It is the oldest, most far-reaching, and most effective of all the integration programs. Full Time Support (FTS) personnel provide the Reserves AC/RC link to the Total Army.

FTS is rooted in the National Defense Act of 1916.¹⁵ At that time War Department leaders recognized that RC units needed a core of full time staff to ensure that administrative and infrastructure tasks were accomplished for the unit. Since then, FTS personnel have evolved from simple caretakers to critical full time administrators and leaders. The FTS

personnel associated with this program consist of Department of the Army Civilians, AC Soldiers and Officers, AGR Soldiers and Officers, as well as Military Technician (MILTEC) civilian employees¹⁶.

FTS personnel, in all their roles, have provided the critical link between the AC and the RC since their inception. In most cases, they are funded by the RC and incorporated in the RC organizational structure; but they provide the full time ability to review doctrine, resource training and conduct planning to ensure that RC units are ready to complete their wartime missions. GAO studies have affirmed the administration and effectiveness of the FTS program.¹⁷ Their studies cite various issues and resource constraints, but they consistently conclude that effective full time manning in RC units is the key to readiness. They have found a direct relationship exists between the number of full time personnel assigned to a unit and the readiness status of that unit. Nonetheless, the program poses some persistent problems.

- With a mixed full time work force, authority for day-to-day supervision is often vague or contrary to military/civilian rank structure.¹⁸ Mixing civilian technicians with AGR personnel can cause organizational problems within units.¹⁹ The GAO concluded, as far back as 1985, that there should not be a mix of civilian technicians and AGR personnel in deployable troop units because of concerns with chain of command overlap.²⁰ Nonetheless, this mix and its inherent problems persists today.
- Unionization of MILTECs dilutes command authority and adversely affects the responsiveness and discipline of RC units.²¹ Overtime and work restrictions for civilian employees hinder their ability to accomplish “green suiter tasks”. Issues of authority arise when RC Commanders have to differentiate between “Mr. Smith” and “SSG Smith”.
- TPU soldiers sometimes feel MILTECS have an unfair advantage for promotions and other beneficial personnel actions.²² MILTEC personnel, since they work full time within a unit, have a better opportunity to take advantage of schooling and other opportunities to advance their careers. Their perceived advantage sometimes causes rifts between the TPU soldier and the MILTECs.
- Dual supervision resulting from different MILTEC and unit chains of command causes conflicting demands on MILTEC personnel. MILTEC personnel often find themselves working for one chain of command as a drilling soldier and another

when they are serving as a civilian. This situation can stress both the MILTEC and chain of command, to the detriment of the unit and its members.

- Many deployable Reserve Units still have full time DA civilians within their organizations. These civilians provide an invaluable service to the units in garrison; but since they do not mobilize or deploy with the units, their critical support vanishes when the unit needs it most.

Since Full Time Manning is the most far reaching and important integration program within the RC, it is also the most complicated and hard to control. Over the years a number of program changes have made it more effective but there is still room for improvement. Since this program has such a far-reaching and positive impact on RC readiness, it should be targeted for refinement and expansion in the future. Additionally, its focus on personnel rather than equipment or organizational structure will keep it relevant during even the most drastic structural changes within the RC.

ARMY TEAMING PROGRAM

Forces Command provided implementations guidance on the Army Teaming Program in August 1998; the program was implemented in October of the same year.²³ The goal of this Army Teaming was to strengthen the Army's ability to respond across the full spectrum of military operations by building training relationships between AC and National Guard Divisions.²⁴

Army Teaming focused on the divisional level; it has proven to be one of the most flexible of the integration programs. Teams have great latitude in deciding how the program is to be implemented between the team partners. Teaming has proven to be a very beneficial integration program for the both the AC and its RC target, the National Guard. Unfortunately, this program has proven fairly expensive from the National Guard perspective. The Guard must use significant amounts on non-reimbursable personnel resources to conduct AC training support at the National Training Center/Joint Readiness Training Center rotations and division war fighter exercises. Distances between unit locations have also limited some Army Teaming integration activities.²⁵

With the extremely high Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), caused by the GWOT, the four AC divisions in the program have been deployed and have had little time to support teaming activities with their partner units. Continued high OPTEMPO and the significant organizational

restructuring that is pending throughout the components may make the current organizational partnerships less viable, or even impossible. As future force structures are developed and the AC/RC mix is modified, new teaming associations should be established. As new teams are formed careful consideration should be given about what contingencies the units are structured to support as well as geographical locations of units. Geographical proximity between teaming partners will reduce the cost of the program and increase interaction between the forces.

The concept of teaming/partnership should remain valid throughout the transformational changes of the future. Its actual structure and participants, however, will change as the Army continues to transform. Teaming opportunities and relationships should be considered during development of the AC/RC unit-mix, with geographical proximity a major consideration.

WHAT EFFECT WILL TRANSFORMATION HAVE ON AC/RC INTEGRATION?

The balance of capabilities in the active and reserve components today is not the best for the future.²⁶

— Donald Rumsfeld

As the Army reviews its lessons learned from recent mobilizations and deployments and continues to transform, many changes to AC/RC integration programs are on the horizon. Secretary Rumsfeld directed the military leadership to rebalance the AC/RC force mix.²⁷ DoD guidance will significantly impact current unit structures as well as the mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support units within both components. Restructuring may well continue with an ongoing cap on active force strength, perhaps with reduced strength.

In order to remain relevant and support the future strategy, the Army must develop integration programs that will proactively support ongoing transformation initiatives. Programs that remain rigid until transformation actions are complete will become irrelevant. Future AC/RC integration programs need to meet the emerging conditions for transformation. They can do this by being flexible and anticipating change that will complement the Army's future force structure.

There are a number of ways that transformation will affect AC/RC integration:

- Transformational initiative creates an environment that is conducive to far sweeping changes. Changes to integration programs should be revolutionary. If we persist with the evolutionary changes to AC/RC integration that have been used in the past, the speed of transformation will quickly make them irrelevant.

- Elimination of redundant programs will be the norm. Interdependence among all components will be a hallmark of the transformed force. Army components can no longer protect programs because of simple political support or through turf battles.
- Force structural changes will affect organizationally based integration programs. Current AC/RC programs, no matter how effective today, that are based solely on unit structure are at risk. Changes in AC/RC mix may negate some initiatives such as Force XXI Heavy Division redesign, Integrated Divisions and Integrated Light infantry Battalions.
- Dedicated funding for AC/RC integration programs has not been available in the past, so RC Units have funded initiatives out of their current budgets. After paying for the current operations associated with the GWOT and fencing money for transformation and operations, there will be little left over for AC/RC programs that are not integral to the transformation process. Additionally, those AC/RC integration initiatives that are not resource-intensive have a better chance for implementation.
- Transformation requires a Total Force in the purest sense. There will be no place in the transformed Army for residual cultural biases or parochial allegiances. Because of this, integration programs that target this bias will be the most effective and support transformational efforts most completely.

During this unprecedented time of transformation, the Total Army concept should be central to all facets of planning and change within the military. Transformation makes AC/RC integration a target of opportunity.

SO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? POSSIBLE CHANGES

The Army components must be supported, resourced, and modernized as one fully and completely integrated team.²⁸

— GEN Dennis Reimer

We have a number of options to expand AC/RC integration and simultaneously support transformational change within the armed forces. Some current programs should be maintained and improved. Others, good as though they were, will be rendered irrelevant by future force structure changes. Some programs and systems need to be developed to help set the

conditions for positive transformational AC/RC integration change rather than simply reacting to it.

New integration programs should be developed and adapted consistent with the following assumptions:

- Implement integration programs that are in synch with the transformation process.
- Programs should target areas that will be affected least by change in organizational structure and redistribution of capabilities among the components.
- Programs should target barriers to total integration. Initiatives that target the reduction of historic AC/RC biases will be the most effective in fostering long-term, positive change.
- Improvement and maintenance of RC readiness must be the overall goal of any integration program. The RC must remain relevant and ready to support contingencies.
- Programs must cut out redundancies within the components. Sleeker, more agile organizations will be the norm - not only in equipment, but also in personnel systems.
- Identify corps areas that will not change during transformation and target their refinement.
- Continue full-time support to RC units. These personnel must more effectively support the force both pre- and post-mobilization.
- Programs should focus on developing a homogenous team of all components, thereby finally achieving the pure Total Force that was conceived in 1973.
- Programs should leverage the impetus of transformation to undertake some far-reaching and significant changes.

Some specific AC/RC integration programs that should be continued or considered further are described in the following pages. These programs will support the Army's transformation efforts; they are far-reaching; they can take advantage of the impetus and futuristic thinking of transformation.

UPDATE THE FULL TIME SUPPORT (FTS) MANNING PROGRAM

Update the Reserve FTS Manning Program by removing MILTECs and DA Civilians from deployable units and filling their positions with AC or AGR Soldiers. Filling all FTS slots with AC or AGR Soldiers, rather than a mix of uniformed personnel and civilians, will resolve a number of issues associated with the command and control and deployability of units. This modification of the FTS system within the RC will enhance this important and far-reaching program and better posture RC units for improved readiness.

This program would have a number of benefits to the force:

- Maintaining an on-going rotation of uniformed FTS personnel in each deployable unit thus keeping the AC/RC bond updated.
- Ensures that all FTS personnel mobilize with their associated unit.
- Eliminates conflicting lines of authority that many times exists with a mixture of DA civilians and uniformed (AGR/AC) full time staff.
- Eliminates overlap of responsibilities between civilian FTS staff and TPU soldiers.

Issues associated with the program:

- Redistribution of civilian FTS is both expensive and time consuming (if retirement and "grandfathering" is part of the implementation process).
- Requires movement of DA civilians and MILTECs from deployable units to support positions.
- The program will have costs; but there will be some cost savings realized from replacing lower grade civilian personnel with junior NCOs and Soldiers. Replacement of higher grade civilians with senior NCOs and officers may result in increased costs. A detailed cost analysis of this program is required.

INTEGRATION OF AC AND AGR TOURS OF DUTY

Modification of the Army personnel system to integrate AC and AGR tours of duty will further integrate the force and significantly reduce component bias. With this program, AC and AGR duties would be interchangeable. AC Soldiers or officers will have opportunities throughout their career to serve in RC as well as AC assignments. The Army has made efforts

in this area by combining Personnel Command (PERSCOM) with Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM) under the command of U.S. Army Human Resource Command. Thus the personnel system has already postured itself to support this concept.

This program would offer a number of benefits to the force:

- It affects the single most important readiness factor for the RC, full time manning.
- It gives Reserve units a clearer picture of current active force training and operational requirements.
- It helps to break down the stereotypes that persist between the components. Soldiers and officers would serve tours in both AC and RC units throughout their career. The parochial view associated with various components would start to diminish as would the “us versus them” mentality.
- It forces the Army to combine sections of the assignment and personnel management of all full time positions throughout the world. It begins to reduce the redundancies of two full time personnel manning systems (AGR & AC).

Issues associated with the program:

- Personnel rating systems and senior rater profiling must be reviewed to eliminate favoritism toward any component.
- Currently all required AGR positions are not filled. Filling these positions will require great support from the AC which may even involve force structure increase.

This program puts our personnel system on the track to a totally integrated system and reduces the redundancy of two full time personnel management systems. It also sets the conditions for a total elimination of the AGR program with its integration into the AC personnel system.

CONSOLIDATION OF AC AND AGR PERSONNEL SYSTEMS

Total consolidation of the AC and AGR personnel systems by the elimination of the AGR personnel system is the next step toward total integration. Under this proposed system all full time military personnel would serve as AC soldiers. The AGR system, as currently organized,

would cease to exist. This consolidation is radical and politically volatile, but it fundamentally serves AC/RC integration in the future force.

This program would offer a number of benefits to the force

- Most far-reaching of all proposed integration programs.
- Focused on changing mindset of soldiers at all levels.
- Streamlines personnel system, reducing the redundancy of two full time personnel systems.

Issues associated with the program:

- The priority of fill to all full time positions would need to be strictly controlled. Possibly the percentages (or numbers) may need to be stipulated by law to prevent a higher percentage filling of AC units to the detriment of already severely undermanned full time RC positions.
- We must maintain a process for integration of qualified TPU soldier volunteers back on to active duty in order to maintain soldier strength in all grades.
- Consideration would require significant changes to Army regulations and Law.

A total integration of the AC and AGR personnel system would bring us as close to the Total Force concept as any other integration program. Reduction in redundant personnel systems will also benefit the transformation process.

TRAINING SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Training Support Battalions (TSBs) are a very effective means for both the training and mobilization of RC units. TSBs effectively keep reserve units updated with doctrinal and training requirements. This program will remain effective in the future even with significant force structure changes.

AC/RC BATTALION COMMANDER EXCHANGE PROGRAM

The AC/RC Battalion Commander Exchange Program is limited in scope. If continued, it should be combined with the integration of AC and AGR tours. In fact, given the inability of the

RC to support the program with TPU drilling reservists and subsequent filling of slots with AGR officers, this program has already devolved into an AGR/AC exchange.

MULTI-COMPONENT UNITS

Multi-Component Units have proven themselves, so they should be retained and modified to support the future force. The program may be somewhat dormant prior to major AC/RC force structure changes. The concept of multi-component units needs to remain a central theme as the AC/RC mix is changed to meet Secretary Rumsfeld's restructuring guidance.

BARRIERS TO CHANGE

Significant changes to the force structure and mindset of the Army does not come easily. This resistance was most evident during implementation of the Total Force Policy. Very few military leaders supported the policy, and many expressed their concerns publicly. It was not until the program was made into law by the Congress and implemented that the services accepted and supported the program. However, the provisions of the policy are currently considered by most to have significantly improved the capability and interoperability of the forces.

Now is the time to make significant changes in the way that we operate. In order to make a significant positive impact on the system and move closer to the end state of a purely Total Force, we must make transformational and sweeping changes. Because some changes may affect "rice bowls" and program control, both our military and civilian leadership, as well as our lawmakers, must openly and unequivocally support real change:

- Cultural Barriers - The cultural barriers that have historically existed between the components have been the most significant barriers to change. If these barriers can be eliminated, or even reduced, many more options may be open for AC/RC integration in the future.
- Resources - There will be some windfalls from reductions in redundant systems and other efficiencies as we move closer to a Total Force. Initially there will be a requirement for additional resources such as additional paid manpower days for the RC units in their support of AC operations.

- Laws and Regulations - Legal and regulatory changes must keep pace with the Army's transformation initiative. New programs that bog down awaiting legal support may become irrelevant even before implementation. Title 10 and Title 32 United States Code must be reviewed and changed as necessary to keep pace with transformational integration programs. Many of the changes will only be implemented through the power of law. Without this type of implementation, no sweeping and lasting changes will be possible.
- Lobby influence from Reserve Forces - In order to realize savings in the personnel area through reduction of redundant systems, the RC should give up some control of their full time manning personnel system. Political barriers, especially associated with the National Guard, have proven to be great barriers in the past.
- Troop Caps and Manning levels – Army Programs that require an increase to AC end strength are susceptible to quick rejection. Each requested increase in end strength must be totally based on mission requirement.
- Component Cultures - This is one of the hardest barriers to overcome. Centuries of traditions in the specific components provide a great barrier to transformational change.
- RC Duty Stereotype – The Army must change the mind set that duty with the RC is the “Kiss of Death”. Participation in many integration programs has in the past had detrimental impacts on AC Soldiers' and officers' careers. The Army must continue to ensure that participation in these programs does not negatively impact careers of either AC or RC soldiers.²⁹

CONCLUSION

The Army cannot wait for the fog of transformation to clear to plan for future integration of the components. By maintaining relevant integration programs, by updating them as necessary, and by changing some of the basic principles of Army personnel management, we will be better postured to support the future force. In particular, we need to target integration at the basic unit of an Army organization, the Soldier. As we integrate at this level, we will start to change the mindset that has existed since the inception of the Reserve forces and enable Soldiers, of all components, to better understand the issues and requirements for a Total Force. This greater understanding will help to integrate the units like no other program. Likewise, new

and updated programs and policies will enable us to come closer to the Total Force concept and maintain the readiness of our ever shrinking armed forces.

In the past, the Army has designed its programs to better integrate the RC into the AC structure. The Army is currently pursuing integration on an initiative-by-initiative basis. There is no overarching plan to guide the multiple efforts.³⁰ Integration plans do not specify how integration (or the Total Force) will assist the Army in its goal of achieving the correct balance of reserve and active forces that will be able to meet the country's defense requirements.³¹ Now, as the Army is transforming, we need to modify that approach. Integration programs need to target biases at the lowest level: They must show the RC how to function with the AC, as well as teach the AC about the requirements and constraints of the Reserve forces.

Better implementations of full time manning systems within the reserves, coupled with a total integration of the AGR and AC personnel system, will not only improve unit readiness and target redundant systems but also subdue the key enemy of integration, a negative bias between the components. This change will trigger far-reaching positive effects; but will also meet resistance and therefore prove difficult to implement. The Army must use the overarching impetus of transformation and current requirements of the GWOT to break down barriers to this needed change.

WORD COUNT= 5710

ENDNOTES

¹. Patrick M. Cronin, *The Total Force Policy in Historical Perspective*, Center for Naval Analysis, CRM 876-78, June 1987, 9.

² Dennis J. Reimer, One Team One Fight One Future, Total Army Integration 2000, 1

³. Cronin, 6.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid, 9.

⁷ General Accounting Office, *Force Structure, Army is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces, but Challenges Remain*, (Washington, D.C., United States U.S. General Accounting Office) 18 July 2000, 3.

⁸ *Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 – Volume 1 Study Report*, Department of Defense. Available on <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rces2005_072299.html> accessed on 24 September 2003.

⁹ Donald H Rumsfeld. "Rumsfeld Opposes Increasing Active Military Personnel" United States Embassy – Tokyo, 18 April 2002, 1: available on <<http://usembassy.state.gov/tokyo/wwwhse1334.html> > Internet accessed on 22 September 2003.

¹⁰ General Accounting Office, *Force Structure, Army is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces, but Challenges Remain*, (Washington, D.C., United States U.S. General Accounting Office) 18 July 2000, 8-38.

¹¹ General Accounting Office, *Information on Military Technician Conversions to Full-Time Active Duty Guard and Reserve* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 8 September 1982 and General Accounting Office, *Report to the Secretary of the Army, Problems In Implementing the Army Reserve Components Full-Time Manning program*, (Washington, D.C., U.S. General Accounting Office) 4 June 1985.

¹² The prerequisites for TPU officers applying to the program include: command at the company level, completion of CGSC and field grade positions as an S-3 or XO. Not enough TPU officers are applying for the program so the RC has resorted to filling the positions with AGR officer. There is some times, however, a problem with the AGR officers meeting all of the prerequisites for the program. These prerequisites are sometimes hard for AGR officers to meet because they have a limited availability to command companies as well as serve as BN S-3s and executive officers within TPU units.

¹³ Dan Elder, *Training Support XXI prepares the Total Army*, The NCO Journal, Spring 2002, Available from http://usasma.bliss.army.mil/Journal/archives/2002/spring/2002spring_articles_training_support_xxi.htm; Internet accessed on 21 December 2003

¹⁴ There have been two Integrated Divisions organized; the 24th ID in Fort Riley and the 7th ID in Fort Carson. Both units have an AC division HQ supporting 4 enhanced NG brigade. These units are not designed to deploy to combat as a division but are organized for training.

¹⁵ General Accounting Office, *Information on Military Technician Conversions to Full-Time Active Duty Guard and Reserve* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 8 September 1982).

¹⁶ Military Technician (MT) – Federal employee of the U.S. Army reserves who is required as a condition of employment to maintain membership in the Selected Reserves.

¹⁷ General Accounting Office, *Information on Military Technician Conversions to Full-Time Active Duty Guard and Reserve* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 8 September 1982 and General Accounting Office, *Report to the Secretary of the Army, Problems In Implementing the Army Reserve Components Full-Time Manning program*, (Washington, D.C., U.S. General Accounting Office) 4 June 1985.

¹⁸ General Accounting Office, *Report to the Secretary of the Army, Problems In Implementing the Army Reserve Components Full-Time Manning program*, (Washington, D.C., U.S. General Accounting Office) 4 June 1985, 5.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid, 9.

²² Ibid, 10.

²³ AC/RC Memo Dated 20 NOV 2001 SUBEJCT: AC/RC Integration Item 98-101, Army Teaming. Memo for Reserve Component Coordination Council (RCCC).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ General Accounting Office, *Force Structure, Army is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces, but Challenges Remain*, (Washington, D.C., United States U.S. General Accounting Office) 18 July 2000, 10.

²⁶ Donald Rumsfeld, Donald, "Rebalancing Forces," Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Under Secretaries of Defense, Washington, DC 9 July 2003.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Dennis J. Reimer, *One Team One Fight One Future*, Total Army Integration 2000, 2.

²⁹ In order to ensure that participants in the Battalion Commander Exchange Program were not negatively affected during their evaluations reports the FORSCOM Commander requested and received personnel changes from the HRC (then PERSCOM) Commander. These changes allowed AC & RC officers to be pooled together into the Senior rate's profile group in order to allow for a larger profile grouping. Reference memorandums: Hendrix, John W., "Recommendation for Change to Senior Rater Profiling," Memorandum for Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, VA, 5 March 2001 and Adair, Lawrence R. "Recommendation for Change to Senior Rater Profiling," Memorandum for Commander FORSCOM, Fort McPherson, GA, 13 March 2001.

³⁰ Carol R. Schuster, *Force Structure – Army in Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces, but Challenge Remain*, 9: available on
< <http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=33A20009200003927&db=mth> > Accessed on 15 September 2003. EBSCO Host search engine.

³¹ Ibid, 9.

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